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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal arises from a qui tam action based on the 
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. SS 3729 et seq. (1994). The 
District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A), which 
provides that no court has jurisdiction over a False Claims 
Act qui tam action that is based on certain public 
disclosures unless the action is brought by an "original 
source." We agree with the District Court that subject 
matter jurisdiction was lacking, and we therefore affirm. 
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I. 
 
A. The qui tam action at issue here was filed by  Mistick 
PBT, a Pittsburgh area construction company. Named as 
defendants were the Housing Authority of the City of 
Pittsburgh ("HACP") and L.D. Astorino & Associates, Ltd. an 
architectural firm, as well as individual employees of the 
HACP and Astorino & Associates. The complaint asserted 
that the defendants made false claims to the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for 
the cost of lead-based paint abatement work at the HACP's 
Bedford and Addison housing projects. Astorino was the 
architectural firm that developed the specifications for the 
lead-based paint abatement work, as well as the larger 
renovation projects of which this work formed a part, and 
Mistick was the general contractor for all of this work. 
 
Since August 1986, HUD regulations have required lead- 
based paint abatement work to be performed at HUD- 
associated housing. See 24 C.F.R. SS 35.20 - 35.24 (1998). 
Such abatement may be achieved either by removing the 
paint or covering it with an "encapsulant" that covers and 
prevents exposure of the lead-based paint. See 24 C.F.R. 
S 35.24. 
 
Astorino's original specifications for the lead abatement 
work at issue were submitted in approximately April or 
June of 1989 and provided for encapsulation using a 
product called "Glid Wall" that was manufactured by the 
Glidden Paint Company. According to Mistick's complaint, 
Mistick bid and later performed its work at the two projects 
on the basis of Astorino's specifications, including the Glid 
Wall specification. Mistick submitted its bids in June and 
July of 1989, and after those bids were accepted and 
contracts were executed, Mistick began work on the 
Addison project by December 1989 and on the Bedford 
project by January 1990. 
 
Although Astorino's specifications called for the use of 
"Glid Wall" as an encapsulant, Glidden had begun 
recommending against the use of this product for this 
purpose some time earlier. A Glidden Product Updates 
Bulletin dated April 1988 stated: 
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       [GLIDDEN] WILL NOT RECOMMEND OR SELL ANY 
       PAINT PRODUCT OR SHEET MATERIAL, SUCH AS 
       GLID-WALL SYSTEM OR VINYL WALL COVERING, 
       FOR USE OVER LEAD CONTAINING MATERIALS 
       WHERE THE PURPOSE OF THE APPLICATION IS TO 
       SEAL OR OTHERWISE RENDER THE AFFECTED 
       AREA NON-HAZARDOUS. 
 
JA 79.1 
 
In June 1988, a firm of "protective coatings (paint) 
consultants" wrote to an Astorino employee that"Glidden 
Company has no desire to warrant [the Glid-Wall System] 
as a lead abatement product, and therein lay their 
admonition regarding its use for that purpose." JA 82. 
According to the affidavit of D. Thomas Mistick, a principal 
of Mistick PBT, representatives of Astorino, the HACP, and 
Mistick attended a meeting on January 5, 1990, at which 
a Glidden representative reiterated the warning contained 
in the April 1988 Products Update Bulletin. JA 547. In 
addition, it appears that, on January 23, 1990, Glidden 
sent Astorino a letter advising that "the Glidwall System 
can not be consider (sic) a method for lead abatement." JA 
450. 
 
In May 1990, Astorino revised its specifications for the 
Bedford and Addison projects and provided for the use of a 
lead encapsulant called Zomat instead of Glid-Wall. This 
change was preceded by a series of letters from Astorino to 
the HACP. On February 14, 1990, Dennis Astorino, a vice- 
president of the architectural firm, wrote to Ernest Miller, 
the HACP's director of development, and attached a letter 
from Astorino's certified industrial hygienist stating that his 
company was "still of the opinion that the Glidwall System 
is the most cost effective method of physical compliance 
with the HUD criteria," although "an increased element of 
risk would be associated with the use of the Glid-Wall 
System since the manufacturer, Glidden, indicates the 
Glid-Wall System is not to be considered as a method for 
lead abatement." JA 449. Dennis Astorino's cover letter 
requested a prompt decision by the HACP regarding the 
method of abatement it wished to use -- either 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "JA" refers to the Joint Appendix. 
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encapsulation using Glid-Wall or some other product or the 
removal of the lead paint. Id. 
 
On April 23, Dennis Astorino again wrote to Miller and 
summarized the events that had resulted in the original 
specification of Glid-Wall. Among other things, the letter 
stated that Astorino's consultants had advised thefirm that 
"Glid-Wall was the encapsulating system of choice" but that 
Glidden "no longer recommend[ed] their product as a lead 
base paint encapsulate and, in fact, [was] actively advising 
against it's (sic) use." JA 435. The letter added: "We 
understand this was do (sic) to potential corporate liability 
concerns." Id. The letter concluded by stating that the field 
of alternative encapsulants had been narrowed to Zomat. 
JA 436. 
 
On April 24, Dennis Astorino wrote another letter to 
Miller in which he again stated that Glidden "no longer 
guarantees [Glid-Wall] for use as a lead base paint 
encapsulate" and again expressed the view that Zomat was 
then "the best solution to the problem of encapsulization." 
JA 434. After observing that Zomat could not have been 
called for in the original specifications because it had only 
recently been marketed as an encapsulant, the letter 
requested additional funding of approximately $750,000 for 
the Bedford project alone. Id. 
 
Seeking to have HUD fund these cost increases, the 
HACP sent several letters to HUD in 1990 and 1992. On 
April 27, 1990, David Washington, the HACP's executive 
director, wrote to John Pisano, the manager of HUD's 
Pittsburgh office, and stated that the HACP needed 
additional funding for the Bedford project because Glidden 
"no longer recommends" Glid-Wall as a lead encapsulant. 
This letter had several attachments, including the February 
14, April 23, and April 27 letters from Astorino to the 
Authority. JA 418-19. 
 
On January 1, 1992, Miller wrote to Paul LaMarca, 
Acting Director of the Public Housing Division of HUD's 
Pittsburgh office, and requested additional funding from 
HUD for the Bedford project. Miller cited the fact that 
Glidden no longer recommended Glid-Wall as an 
encapsulant and that new regulations required "additional 
worker protection methods." JA 457. 
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On July 1, 1992, in response to LaMarca's request for 
more information, Washington wrote to LaMarca and stated 
that "Glidwall became unacceptable as a LBP [lead-based 
paint] encapsulant because the Company informed the 
Architect by letter (1/23/90) that `the Glidwall System can 
not be consider (sic) a method for lead abatement,' in spite 
of the fact that the system met HUD requirements in effect 
at the time and that the Baltimore Housing Authority was 
using it for this purpose." JA 464-65. Apparently referring 
to the situation at the time of the original specifications, the 
letter added: 
 
       To our knowledge, there was no information available 
       to suggest that the Glidwall System was not approved 
       by Glidden for its intended use as a LBP encapsulant. 
 
JA 465. 
 
On July 24, 1992, HUD informed the HACP that it was 
approving $253,622.11 in additional funds for lead 
encapsulation on the Bedford project. JA 469.2 
 
B. Meanwhile, in July 1991, Mistick had filed su it 
against the HACP in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County, claiming that the HACP was liable to 
Mistick under their contract for delay damages resulting 
from the change in the lead-abatement specifications for 
the Bedford and Addison projects. The HACP thenfiled a 
third-party complaint for indemnification and contribution 
against Astorino, and Mistick subsequently moved to 
amend its complaint to add a direct claim of fraud against 
Astorino. In this proposed amended complaint, Mistick 
alleged that (1) Astorino knew at the time it developed the 
original specifications for the Bedford and Addison projects 
that Glidden did not recommend Glid-Wall as a lead-based 
paint encapsulant, (2) Astorino nonetheless specified Glid- 
Wall for lead abatement, (3) Astorino knew or should have 
known that this specification would delay and increase the 
cost of the renovation work, and (4) the Bedford and 
Addison projects were both delayed and Mistick suffered 
damages as a result. JA 226-27. In the alternative, Mistick 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Mistick alleges that the HACP received additional funds for the 
Bedford and Addison projects through HUD's annual budget process. 
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alleged that the HACP knew that Glid-Wall was unsuitable 
for use a lead-based paint encapsulant but that it directed 
Astorino to specify this product anyway, knowing that this 
would cause delay and increased expense. JA 227. The 
Court of Common Pleas denied Mistick's motion to amend 
its complaint because, among other things, the statute of 
limitations had run on Mistick's claim against Astorino, 
and the Court dismissed Astorino as a third-party 
defendant. 
 
Dennis Astorino gave a deposition in the state court 
action in which he acknowledged that the Astorinofirm 
knew, prior to the submission of the original Bedford and 
Addison specifications, that Glidden did not recommend the 
use of Glid-Wall as an encapsulant. JA 99-100. Louis 
Astorino, another principal of the firm, likewise stated in a 
deposition that the firm was aware that Glid-Wall had 
"never" been warranted as a lead-based paint encapsulant, 
but that he looked at Glid-Wall "as a product approved by 
HUD for this situation" and that "HUD never asked for a 
warranty for lead based paint abatement." JA 85-87. 
Mistick's suit against the HACP was eventually settled in 
May 1996. 
 
C. While its suit against the HACP was pending in state 
court, Mistick began what it terms "an investigation . . . 
undertaken . . . for the purpose of gathering information on 
the HACP's relationship with HUD, which investigation was 
entirely separate and distinct from and independent of the 
[suit in state court]." Appellant's Br. at 11. This 
investigation was supposedly prompted by "a series of 
serious administrative problems and construction disputes 
Mistick and other contractors were experiencing, with both 
the HACP and Astorino, on various HUD-associated public 
housing project construction jobs in the Pittsburgh area." 
JA 539. 
 
As part of this investigation, Mistick's attorney, David M. 
Priselac, Esq., filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 
request with HUD in September 1993, and in response, 
HUD released several files for Pittsburgh-area HUD-funded 
projects, including the Bedford and Addison projects. These 
files included the Authority's letters to HUD, dated April 27, 
1990, January 1, 1992, and July 1, 1992, as well as the 
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letters from Astorino to the HACP that were attached to the 
April 27 letter. Mistick viewed the letters submitted to HUD 
as containing false claims regarding the Glid-Wall matter. 
 
D. In November 1995, Mistick filed under seal this qui 
tam action in its own name and on behalf of the United 
States. Mistick's complaint alleged that two false claims 
had been presented to the government. The first claim 
involved the original specifications, which called for the use 
of Glid-Wall as an encapsulant even though certain 
defendants allegedly knew that it was not suited for that 
purpose. The second claim concerned the HACP's request 
for additional funding to pay for part of the cost of 
switching to Zomat as the encapsulant and the allegedly 
false statements made regarding the reasons for the switch. 
Based on each of these two claims, the complaint asserted 
three separate causes of action: for presentation of a false 
claim, in violation of 31 U.S.C. S 3729(a)(1); for making or 
using a false record or statement, in violation of 31 U.S.C. 
S 3729(a)(2); and for conspiring to defraud the government, 
in violation of 31 U.S.C. S 3729 (a)(3). 
 
In July 1996, the District Court granted the 
Government's motion to decline intervention and ordered 
that Mistick's complaint be unsealed and served on the 
HACP and Astorino. The HACP and Astorino filed separate 
motions to dismiss, in which they asserted lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. In March 1997, the District Court 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 31 
U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A), which, as noted, provides that no 
court has jurisdiction over a False Claims Act qui tam suit 
that is based on certain specified types of public 
disclosures unless the action is brought by an "original 
source." The District Court held that this jurisdictional bar 
applied because Mistick's action was based on information 
obtained by Mistick pursuant to a FOIA request and 
discovery in the state court proceeding and because Mistick 
did not qualify under the Act's "original source" exception. 
Mistick then took this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The background of the False Claims Act's qui tam 
provision has been discussed in detail in prior opinions. 
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See United States ex rel. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d 
Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Stinson, 944 F.3d 1149, 
1152-54 (3d Cir. 1991); id. at 1162-68 (Scirica, J., 
dissenting). In brief, the qui tam provision "permits, in 
certain circumstances, suits by private parties on behalf of 
the United States against anyone submitting a false claim 
to the Government. Prior to 1986, such suits were barred 
if the information on which they were based was already in 
the Government's possession." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 941 (1997). In 1986, 
Congress sought "[t]o revitalize the qui tam provisions," 
Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154. After considering several 
alternatives, see Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163-68 (Scirica, J., 
dissenting), Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A), 
which provides: 
 
       No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under 
       this section based upon the public disclosure of 
       allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
       administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
       administrative, or Government Accounting Office (sic) 
       report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the 
       news media, unless the action is brought by the 
       Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 
       an original source of the information. 
 
As previously noted, the District Court held that this 
provision bars Mistick's suit. Mistick argues that the 
District Court's decision rests on three erroneous legal 
determinations. First, Mistick contends that the disclosure 
of information in response to the Priselac FOIA request was 
not one of the kinds of public disclosure that trigger the 
jurisdictional bar set out in 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
Second, Mistick maintains that its state-court suit did not 
involve the same "allegations" or "transactions" as its later 
qui tam action. Third, Mistick argues that it fell within the 
"original source" exception. 
 
A. The FOIA response. As noted, the qui tam provision 
refers to "the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative, or 
Government Accounting Office (sic) report, hearing, audit, 
or investigation, or from the news media." 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A). Thus, in order to fall within this language, 
 
                                9 
  
a disclosure (1) must be "public" and (2) must occur in one 
of the specified contexts. HUD's response to the Priselac 
FOIA request satisfies both of these requirements. 
 
First, the disclosure of information in response to a FOIA 
request is a "public disclosure." The Freedom of Information 
Act states that "[e]ach agency shall make available to the 
public" certain specified categories of information. 5 U.S.C. 
S 552(a)(emphasis added). The Act's "central purpose" is to 
ensure that government activities are "opened to the sharp 
eye of public scrutiny." United States Dep't of Justice v. 
Reporter's Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989)(emphasis 
added). In Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), the Supreme Court 
held that the disclosure of information pursuant to the 
FOIA constitutes a "public disclosure" within the meaning 
of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2055(b)(1), 
and the Court observed: 
 
       [A]s a matter of common usage the term "public" is 
       properly understood as including persons who are FOIA 
       requesters. A disclosure pursuant to the FOIA would 
       thus seem to be most accurately characterized as a 
       "public disclosure" within the plain meaning of [the 
       Consumer Product Safety Act]. 
 
447 U.S. at 108-09 (emphasis added). We see no sound 
basis for construing the term "public disclosure" any more 
narrowly here than the Supreme Court did in GTE 
Sylvania. We therefore conclude that HUD's response to the 
Priselac FOIA request was a "public disclosure."3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent argues that information produced pursuant to a FOIA 
request is not publicly disclosed because it is provided only to the 
requester, who is not obligated to turn it over to others. Dissent at 
28-29. The dissent therefore contends that the information is not 
"publicly accessible," id. at 28, and thus seems to suggest that "public 
disclosure" means making information accessible. 
 
We disagree with the dissent that information available under FOIA is 
not "publicly accessible"; on the contrary, such information is readily 
accessible to any member of the public who makes a request. More 
important, however, the dissent's argument confuses the statutory 
concept of "public disclosure" with the different concept of "public 
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Second, this disclosure occurred within one or more of 
the contexts specified in 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A). To begin, 
we believe that HUD's response constituted an 
"administrative . . . report." Id. In Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 
745, we concluded that the term " `administrative' when 
read with the word `report' refers only to those 
administrative reports that originate with the federal 
government." HUD's response to the FOIA request 
originated with a department of the federal government and 
constituted official federal government action, and therefore 
this response plainly satisfied Dunleavy's definition of 
"administrative." 
 
The response also fell within the ordinary meaning of the 
term "report." A "report" is defined as, among other things, 
"something that gives information" or a "notification," 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1925 (1971), 
and an "official or formal statement of facts or proceeding." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1300 (6th ed. 1990). A response to 
a FOIA request falls within these definitions. Such a 
response provides information and notification regarding 
the results of the agency's search for the requested 
documents and constitutes an official and formal statement 
concerning those results. Although Mistick ridicules the 
argument that a response to a FOIA request is an 
"administrative report," see Reply Br. at 6-7, it is telling 
that Mistick does not offer a definition of this term.4 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
accessibility." Information may be publicly disclosed -- for example, it 
may appear buried in an exhibit that is filed in court without fanfare in 
an obscure case -- and yet not be readily accessible to the general 
public. And information may be easily accessible to the public -- it may 
be available under FOIA to anyone who simply files a request -- but 
unless there is a request and the information is actually produced, it is 
not publicly disclosed. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 746. 
 
4. The dissent argues that a FOIA response is not a report, but the 
dissent -- which elsewhere adheres strictly to the dictionary definition 
of 
the statutory phrase "based upon" (see Dissent at 32) -- does not come 
to grips with the fact that a FOIA response falls easily within accepted 
definitions of the term "report." The dissent seems to have in mind a 
particular type of government report, with "analysis," a "summary," 
and/or a "conclusion," see id. at 29, but the ordinary understanding of 
the term "report" is broader. 
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thus hold that HUD's response to the Priselac FOIA request 
was an "administrative . . . report" and that the documents 
that HUD provided were publicly disclosed "in" that "report."5 
 
We also believe that this response occurred "in a[n] . . . 
administrative . . . investigation." 31 U.S.C.S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
For the reasons already explained, HUD's search for the 
documents sought under the FOIA and its decision to 
disclose them clearly satisfied our court's interpretation of 
the term "administrative," and we believe that these 
processes should be viewed as constituting an 
"investigation" within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A). Accepted definitions of the term 
"investigation" include "a detailed examination," Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1189 (1971), and the 
"making of a search." 1 The Compact Edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary 457 (1971). When an agency receives a 
FOIA request, it is obligated to conduct a search that is 
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.6 
See also, e.g., Miller v. United States Department of Justice, 
779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Weisberg v. United 
States Department of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). Such a search falls within the common 
understanding of the term "investigation." 7 See also 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This holding is entirely consistent with our holding in Dunleavy that 
a report prepared at the behest of a county was not itself an 
"administrative report" because it did not"originate with the federal 
government." 123 F.3d at 744-46. In Dunleavy, the report was not 
produced under the FOIA. Here, we do not hold that the documents at 
issue would have fallen within S 3730(e)(4)(A) had they not been 
produced pursuant to the FOIA. Rather, we hold that HUD's FOIA 
response was an "administrative report" and the documents were 
publicly disclosed "in" that report, just as if they had been reproduced 
as an appendix to a printed report. 
 
6. As with the term "report" (see footnote 4, supra), the dissent insists 
on 
an interpretation of the term "investigation" that is narrower than its 
meaning in ordinary usage. According to the dissent, the term 
"investigation" seems to be limited to a criminal investigation or a like 
investigation of "wrongdoing." Dissent at 29. But in ordinary usage, the 
term is used more broadly. 
 
7. Because we hold that the disclosure at issue occurred in an 
"administrative . . . report" and an "administrative . . . investigation," 
we 
need not and do not reach the defendants' argument that the disclosure 
also occurred in an "administrative . . . hearing." 
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U.S.C. S 552(a)(3)(D) ("For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term `search' means to review, manually or by automated 
means, agency records for the purpose of locating those 
records which are responsive to a request.') 
 
Most of the decisions of other courts support our holding 
that the disclosure of documents under the FOIA triggers 
the jurisdictional bar of 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A). In United 
States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 
1520 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 
939 (1997), the Ninth Circuit stated that documents 
actually produced in response to FOIA requests are publicly 
disclosed for purposes of the qui tam statute. See also 
United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 998 F. 
Supp. 971, 979 (E.D. Wis. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 1038 (7th 
Cir. 1999); United States of America ex rel. Burns v. A.D. 
Roe Co., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 255, 257 (W.D. Ky. 1996); 
United States ex rel. Herbert v. National Academy of 
Sciences, 1992 WL 247587, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1992) 
("Just as civil discovery is public, it must be the case that 
information obtained pursuant to an FOIA request has 
been made public through the administrative process and 
cannot form the basis of a qui tam action. If that were not 
the case then, like court records, public agency records 
would be flooded with citizens requesting information in 
order to bring qui tam suits. Congress did not intend the 
qui tam provision to transform FOIA from sunshine 
legislation into a search for the pot of gold at the end of the 
rainbow."). But see United States ex rel. Pentagen 
Technologies Int'l Ltd. v. CACI Int'l Inc., 1996 WL 11299, at 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1996) 
 
B. The Mistick State Court Action. Mistick argues that 
even if HUD's FOIA response was a covered disclosure 
under 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A), its qui tam action was still 
not jurisdictionally barred. We have held that the public 
disclosure of a "transaction[ ]" within that provision 
requires the disclosure of "the elements of the underlying 
fraudulent transaction." Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 740. This 
means that the disclosure must reveal both the 
misrepresented state of facts and the true state of facts so 
that the inference of fraud may be drawn. Id. at 741. 
Mistick acknowledges that "[t]he misrepresented facts . . . 
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were discovered by Mistick in October 1993, pursuant to 
the Priselac [FOIA] Request." Appellant's Br. at 31. Thus, 
our holding that this disclosure falls within the coverage of 
31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A) requires Mistick to fall back on the 
argument that the jurisdictional bar is not triggered 
"because the other essential element, the true state of facts, 
was not publicly disclosed within the meaning of that 
provision." Id. at 33. 
 
We reject Mistick's fall-back argument because "the true 
state of facts" was disclosed in civil discovery in the Mistick 
state court action, and we held in Stinson, 944 F.2d at 
1160, that civil discovery constitutes "a public disclosure 
. . . in a civil hearing" within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A). According to Mistick, the true facts were (1) 
that the Glidden policy of not recommending Glid-Wall as a 
lead-based encapsulant was in effect before Astorino 
submitted the specifications and (2) that Astorino and the 
Authority were aware of the policy but knowingly 
represented otherwise to HUD. As previously noted, both 
Dennis and Louis Astorino acknowledged these facts in 
their depositions, and Mistick concedes that all of these 
facts were revealed in civil discovery in the state court 
action. At oral argument, the following exchange occurred: 
 
       THE COURT: . . . [D]o I understand your answer to be 
       that all of the essential elements were publicly 
       disclosed in the civil litigation but you knew all of those 
       essential elements previously from other sources, 
       including the FOIA request? 
 
       MR. BEARD: That is correct. 
 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 10. 
 
Mistick contends, however, that although all of the 
essential elements were revealed in either the FOIA 
response or in civil discovery, its qui tam action was not 
"based on" those public disclosures. This argument 
requires us to consider conflicting decisions from several 
other circuits regarding the meaning of the phrase "based 
upon" in 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 
In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 928 
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(1994), the Fourth Circuit held that "based upon" means 
actually derived from. The court explained: 
 
       Section 3730(e)(4)(A)'s use of the phrase "based upon" 
       is, we believe, susceptible of a straightforward textual 
       exegesis. To "base upon" means to "use as a basis for." 
       Webster's Third New International Dictionary 180 
       (1986) (definition no. 2 of verb "base"). Rather plainly, 
       therefore, a relator's action is "based upon" a public 
       disclosure of allegations only where the relator has 
       actually derived from that disclosure the allegations 
       upon which his qui tam action is based. Such an 
       understanding of the term "based upon," apart from 
       giving effect to the language chosen by Congress, is 
       fully consistent with section 3730(e)(4)'s indisputed 
       objective of preventing "parasitic" actions see, e.g., 
       Stinson, supra, at 1154, for it is self-evident that a suit 
       that includes allegations that happen to be similar 
       (even identical) to those already publicly disclosed, but 
       were not actually derived from those public 
       disclosures, simply is not, in any sense, parasitic. 
 
Id. 
 
All of the other circuits that have reached this question 
have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit and have held that 
"based upon" means "supported by" or "substantially 
similar to," so that the relator's independent knowledge of 
the information is irrelevant. See United States ex rel. 
Biddle v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 
147 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. 
___, 1999 WL 66673 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1999); United States ex 
rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
682-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 172 (1997); 
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 
F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 
(1993); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 
F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit observed 
that "[a]s a matter of common usage, the phrase `based 
upon' is properly understood to mean `supported by.' " 
Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552. The District of Columbia 
Circuit, while not expressly embracing the Tenth Circuit's 
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view that "based upon" may mean "supported by" in 
common usage, found the statutory language to be 
ambiguous, and then rejected the Fourth Circuit's 
approach "because it renders the `original source' exception 
to the public disclosure bar largely superfluous." Findley, 
105 F.3d at 683. After observing that the False Claims Act 
"requires that a relator have `direct and independent' 
knowledge of the alleged fraud or some of its components, 
and have voluntarily provided the information to the 
government, in order to benefit from the `original source' 
exception to the jurisdictional bar," the court continued: 
 
       Why, one may ask, assuming the Fourth Circuit test of 
       "based upon" as meaning "derived from," would 
       Congress provide an exception in the case of a relator 
       who has actually derived his complaint from public 
       information, that allows him to demonstrate that he 
       already provided his independently obtained knowledge 
       to the government before he filed suit? . . .[U]nder the 
       Fourth Circuit's interpretation, the primary "based 
       upon" test swallows the original source exception 
       whole. Using "based upon" as a proxy for whether the 
       relator's complaint merely parrots what is already in 
       the public domain, on the other hand, leads logically to 
       a subsidiary inquiry into whether, the relator had 
       obtained the information in his complaint 
       independently prior to the disclosure and so is an 
       "original source." 
 
Id. 
 
We see merit in both the Fourth and District of Columbia 
Circuits' arguments. We agree with the Fourth Circuit that 
in ordinary usage the phrase "based upon" is not generally 
used to mean "supported by." On the other hand, we agree 
with the District of Columbia Circuit that the Fourth 
Circuit's interpretation is suspect because it would render 
the "original source" exception largely superfluous. The 
dissent strives to show that the Fourth Circuit's 
interpretation might not render the original source 
exception entirely superfluous, but we are not persuaded. 
 
The dissent first argues that it may be possible for the 
allegations or transactions set forth in an individual's claim 
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to be derived from a public disclosure, see 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A), and yet for that individual to have had 
direct and independent prior knowledge of "the information 
on which the allegations are based." 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(B). The dissent writes that "a relator who is 
barred because he has derived some of his fraud 
information from a public disclosure may still bring the 
claim as an original source if he has direct and 
independent knowledge of some other essential element of 
the claim." Dissenting Op. at 39-40. However, the dissent 
makes no effort to explain how this interpretation can be 
made to fit the language of 31 U.S.C. SS 3730(e)(4)(A) and 
31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(b) (the "original source" exception). 
Indeed, the dissent does not even commit itself to this 
interpretation but merely raises it as a possibility. See 
Dissenting Op. at 40. Thus, the dissent relies on the 
possibility that the apparent superfluity of the"original 
source" exception (under its interpretation of"based upon") 
may be avoided pursuant to a scheme of interpretation that 
it declines to explicate or embrace. We find this 
unconvincing. 
 
The dissent's second argument, as we understand it, is 
that, even if its interpretation of "based upon" makes the 
"original source" exception substantively superfluous, 
Congress might have adopted that exception in order to 
provide a different procedural avenue for a qui tam relator 
to use in showing that his action was not derived from a 
public disclosure. The dissent writes that "it may be easier 
for the relator to establish himself as an `original source' of 
the information than to successfully disprove a caused link 
between the public disclosures and his qui tam claim." 
Dissent at 40. However, even if there were no "original 
source" exception as such, an individual could still prove 
that his information was not derived from a public 
disclosure by showing that he was an original source of the 
information. Thus, this argument fails to explain why 
Congress would have adopted the "original source" 
exception if the phrase "based upon" in 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A) meant "derived from." As a result, we agree 
with the District of Columbia Circuit that the Fourth 
Circuit's interpretation of "based upon" makes the "original 
source" exception largely superfluous. 
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We are thus confronted with a clash between two textual 
arguments concerning the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(e)(4)(A): one based on the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase "based upon" and one based on the precept that a 
statute should be construed if possible so as not to render 
any of its terms superfluous. See, e.g ., United States v. 
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992); Astoria Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 
(1991); First Bank Nat. Ass'n v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 362, 367 (3d 
Cir. 1996); United Steelworkers of America v. North Star 
Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 1114 (1994). In the end, we are persuaded to follow 
the majority approach. 
 
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) does not reflect careful drafting or a 
precise use of language. To begin with a small example, this 
section refers to the General Accounting Office as the 
"Government Accounting Office" and thus misnames an 
instrumentality that Congress has consistently viewed as 
its own. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 731 (1986). 
The section refers awkwardly to "the public disclosure . . . 
from the news media." Id. (emphasis added). The section 
refers to criminal and civil "hearing[s]," when it surely 
means, not just those proceedings that are generally 
labeled "hearings," but also full-blown criminal and civil 
trials, and other court proceedings that are not described 
as "hearings" in standard usage. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 
1154-58. The section refers to jurisdiction over"an action" 
that is based on a public disclosure, and thus the drafters 
seem to have overlooked the elementary point that a qui 
tam "action" may contain multiple claims, only some of 
which may be "based upon" a public disclosure, however 
that phrase is defined. In addition, whether the phrase 
"based upon" means "derived from" or"supported by," a 
careful drafter would have realized the need to specify the 
degree to which the "action" must be "based upon" the 
public disclosure in order to fall within the jurisdictional bar.8 
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) refers to the disclosure of"allegations 
or transactions," but S 3730(e)(4)(B), in referring to 
independent knowledge "of the information on which the 
allegations are based," inexplicably fails to mention 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We were required to decide this point in Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 746. 
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"transactions." (Are "transactions" irrelevant under this 
latter provision? Are they subsumed within the concept of 
"allegations"?) The inescapable conclusion is that the qui 
tam provision does not reflect careful drafting. 
 
In light of this apparent lack of precision, we are hesitant 
to attach too much significance to a fine parsing of the 
syntax of S 3730(e)(4)(A). We find Section 3730(e)(4)(A) to be 
syntactically ambiguous because we are uncertain that the 
drafters of that provision focused on the difference in 
precise usage between, on the one hand, a suit based upon 
a public disclosure of an allegation or transaction and, on 
the other, a suit based upon an allegation or transaction 
and that has been publicly disclosed.9  Under these 
circumstances, we think that it is best to follow the 
majority interpretation, which is much more consistent 
with the rest of the qui tam provision. We thus hold that a 
qui tam action is "based upon" a qualifying disclosure if the 
disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although we do not rely on the legislative history of the qui tam 
provision in reaching this conclusion, see Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154, it 
is interesting that sponsors of the 1986 False Claim Act Amendments 
described it as having a meaning consistent with our holding. Senator 
Grassley, one of original Senate sponsors, in speaking of the technical 
and clarifying amendments that introduced the present language in 
S 3730(e)(4)(A), stated: 
 
       [J]urisdiction for qui tam actions based on information that has 
       been publicly disclosed will be limited to those people who were 
       "original sources" of the information . . . . 
 
132 Cong. Rec. S11238-04 (Aug. 11, 1986) (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Representative Berman, one of the sponsors of the House bill, submitted 
"legislative history" that stated in relevant part: 
 
       Before the relevant information regarding fraud is publicly 
disclosed 
       through various government hearings, reports and investigations 
       which are specifically identified in the legislation or through the 
       news media, any person may file such an action as long as it is 
filed 
       before the government filed an action based upon the same 
       information. Once, the public disclosure of the information occurs 
       through one of the methods referred to above, then only a person 
who 
       qualifies as an "original source" may bring the action. 
 
132 Cong. Rec. H9382-03 (Oct. 7, 1986) (emphasis added). 
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qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui 
tam action's claims. Because the latter condition is satisfied 
here, the qui tam action at issue was "based upon" 
qualifying disclosures and is consequently subject to the 
jurisdictional bar of S 3730(e)(4)(A) unless it is saved by the 
"original source" exception, to which we next turn. 
 
C. "Original source" exception. Section 3730(e)(4)(A)'s 
jurisdictional bar does not apply if "the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information." Section 
3730(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added) defines an "original source" 
as 
 
       an individual who has direct and independent 
       knowledge of the information on which the allegations 
       are based and has voluntarily provided the information 
       to the Government before filing an action under this 
       section which is based on the information. 
 
Here, Mistick is not an "original source" because it did 
not have "direct and independent knowledge" of the most 
critical element of its claims, viz., that the Authority had 
made the alleged misrepresentations to HUD regarding its 
knowledge about Glid-Wall's unsuitability as a lead-based 
paint encapsulant at the time of the original specifications. 
"[A] relator who would not have learned of the information 
absent public disclosure [does] not have `independent' 
information within the statutory definition of`original 
source.' " Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160. As previously noted, 
Mistick acknowledges that "[t]he misrepresented facts were 
discovered by Mistick in October 1993, pursuant to the 
Priselac FOIA Request." Appellant's Br. at 31. Since HUD's 
FOIA response was a qualifying public disclosure under 
S 3730(e)(4)(A), Mistick was not an original source of that 
information. While "it is not necessary for a relator to have 
all the relevant information in order to qualify as 
`independent,' " Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160, a relator cannot 
be said to have "direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which [its fraud] allegations are based," 31 
U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(B), if the relator has no direct and 
independent knowledge of the allegedly fraudulent 
statements. Thus, Mistick's "original source" argument 
fails. 
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III. 
 
In summary, we hold that Mistick's qui tam action was 
barred by 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A) because it was "based 
upon the public disclosure" of the relevant transactions in 
an "administrative . . . report" and "investigation" (HUD's 
search for the documents sought in the FOIA request and 
its response to that request) and in a "civil . .. hearing" 
(discovery in Mistick's state-court action) and because 
Mistick does not qualify as an "original source."10 We 
therefore affirm the decision of the District Court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In light of our disposition of these issues, we find it unnecessary to 
address the other grounds for affirmance that the defendants have 
advanced. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting: 
 
Judge Alito's majority opinion cuts through this 
enormously complicated area of the law in a candid and 
straightforward manner. While the result it reaches is not 
unreasonable, it is, I respectfully submit, incorrect. On the 
critical "based upon" issue, Judge Alito follows the majority 
view of other circuits. As I will explain, I would follow the 
minority view, primarily because it alone is faithful to the 
plain language of the governing statute. More particularly, 
I do not believe that the phrase "based upon," especially in 
the context in which it is found in the False Claims Act 
("FCA"), can properly be read to mean, as the majority here 
concludes, "supported by." Rather, it means"derived from" 
or "used as a basis for." I take issue with the majority's 
contention that we may avoid this plain reading of"based 
upon" because Congress was sloppy in its drafting of the 
jurisdictional bar. I also follow the minority view because I 
believe that it better reflects the policy that Congress had in 
mind in its most recent amendments to the FCA. Finally, I 
believe that the present majority is incorrect in asserting 
that a plain reading of "based upon" would render the 
"original source" exception superfluous. 
 
On the "public disclosure" issue, the majority feels bound 
by our prior caselaw, particularly United States ex rel. 
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential 
Insurance Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991). While we are 
constrained to follow our binding precedent, I disagree with 
the majority's broad reading of Stinson, which arose in a 
very different context--civil litigation--than that involved 
here. More specifically, I believe that materials obtained 
through a FOIA request do not constitute a "public 
disclosure" under the FCA, even given our holding in 
Stinson, because a government agency's act of locating and 
duplicating records for a single FOIA requester is 
fundamentally different from the disclosure of discovery 
material in civil litigation, which includes a "presumption 
. . . of public access." Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1159. 
 
These readings of the statute compel the conclusion that 
the jurisdictional bar does not apply in this case. First, if, 
as I believe, the FOIA material does not constitute a public 
disclosure, Mistick would not be barred from bringing its 
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qui tam action, given our prior caselaw. Second, under my 
interpretation of "based upon," Mistick's qui tam action 
would not be barred if it obtained the information 
underlying its claim from a source other than a public 
disclosure. It has so alleged, and this may in fact be the 
case. Therefore, even if the FOIA material is deemed a 
public disclosure, I would still reverse the District Court's 
decision dismissing Mistick's qui tam claim and remand for 
a determination by that court whether the claim is"based 
upon," i.e., derived from, information in any public 
disclosures. Because I would reverse the District Court's 
determination that Mistick's claim is "based upon" public 
disclosures, I would not reach the question whether Mistick 
is an original source of the information in any public 
disclosures. 
 
So that it is fresh in our minds as we weave our way 
through this statutory maze, I rescribe the relevant 
jurisdictional bar: 
 
       No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under 
       this section based upon the public disclosure of 
       allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
       administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
       administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
       report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the 
       news media, unless the action is brought by the 
       Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 
       an original source of the information. 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994). As it will make for a more 
orderly discussion, I will first address the public disclosure 
issue. In the course of that discussion, the tenor of which 
is adumbrated above, I will explain why I believe Stinson to 
have been wrongly decided and hence a candidate, at some 
point in time, for en banc consideration. 
 
I. Public Disclosures 
 
The majority concludes that both the information in the 
state-court discovery and the product of Mistick's FOIA 
request constituted public disclosures. I am constrained to 
agree with the first of these holdings, as this was the 
precise issue decided in Stinson. However, I dissent from 
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the second, as I do not believe that Stinson--even if it were 
correctly decided--inexorably leads to the conclusion that 
information obtained through a FOIA request by a single 
individual is necessarily a "public disclosure." Explication 
of my position on the FOIA issue will be informed by 
explaining at the outset my problems with Stinson's 
definition of public disclosure, under which discovery 
material given to a single person in litigation between two 
private parties, and not even filed with a court, constitutes 
a "public disclosure." 
 
In Stinson, the panel majority reasoned that"section 
3730(e)(4) [is] designed to preclude qui tam suits based on 
information that would have been equally available to 
strangers to the fraud transaction had they chosen to look 
for it as it was to the relator." Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1155-56. 
It specifically held that "[i]nformation gleaned in litigation 
and on file in the clerk's office falls in this category," even 
if the information is actually known only to the small group 
of private litigants involved in the action in which the 
information was presented through discovery. Id. at 1156; 
see also id. at 1158 ("[D]isclosure of discovery material to a 
party who is not under any court imposed limitation as to 
its use is a public disclosure under the FCA."). 
 
The holding in Stinson was based in part on the fact that 
"the Local Rules of some district courts provide that the 
court may order the filing of discovery materials at the 
request of any person who has an interest in reviewing the 
materials." Id. at 1158-59. Although the panel may have 
been technically correct, this statement obscures the actual 
situation in most federal courts. In this circuit, every U.S. 
district court proscribes by local rule the filing of discovery 
material.1 The assumption that the right to seek access to 
such unfiled materials by requesting their filing, see infra 
note 2, will be availed of in any but a handful of cases 
seems blithe. First, the procedure is costly and 
cumbersome. Second, individuals unconnected with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See D. Del. R. Civ. P. 5.4(a) (providing that discovery materials 
"shall 
not be filed with the Court"); D.N.J. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c)(1) (same); E.D. 
Pa. 
R. Civ. P. 26.1(a) (same); M.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 5.4(b) (same); W.D. Pa. R. 
Civ. P. 5.3(A) (same). 
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litigation, other than the media, will generally not know of 
it or will be unmotivated to bear the cost and burden of 
pursuing the filing of such material. 
 
More importantly, Stinson's definition appears to me to 
encompass a much broader category of "disclosures" than 
what Congress intended to include within that term. Cf. 
United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 861-62 
(7th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e reject the construction . . . according 
to which there is public disclosure if the allegations are 
disclosed to any single member of the public not previously 
informed thereof." (internal quotations and brackets 
omitted)); Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1169 (Scirica, J., dissenting) 
("I do not believe Congress intended to bar relators who 
obtain non-public information simply because that 
information might become public at a later time."). 
 
Congress's primary intent in enacting the 1986 FCA 
amendments was "to enhance the Government's ability to 
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the 
Government." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. As for the qui tam 
provisions of the FCA amendments, Congress's "overall 
intent" was "to encourage more private enforcement suits." 
Id. at 23-24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288-89. 
While avoiding parasitic lawsuits was clearly an additional 
goal, there is no indication that Congress sought to 
preclude the disclosure and prosecution of fraud when a 
prior, purely technical disclosure had been made. Rather, 
like Judge Scirica, "I can discern no reason why Congress 
would be concerned about information that has not yet 
been disclosed to the general public." Stinson, 944 F.2d at 
1170 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
 
By precluding suits "based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions in" specific judicial, legislative, 
or administrative sources, or through the news media, 
Congress sought to ensure that no qui tam relator could 
profit from information that had become part of the public 
domain. Interpreting "public disclosure" to encompass 
information passed from one private litigant to another in 
the context of some obscure litigation may simplify our task 
of weeding out legitimate qui tam cases from parasitic ones 
(by effectively avoiding this sometimes difficult factual 
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question), but it fails to serve Congress's primary goals of 
encouraging disclosure and aiding prosecution of fraud on 
the government. There is no assurance that information 
about a fraud on the government, contained in privately 
disclosed discovery material (which will always constitute a 
"public disclosure" under Stinson), will either come to the 
government's attention or will lead to a private qui tam 
action. I agree with Judge Scirica's observation that 
"Congress drew the line at the point of actual public 
disclosure because it felt that this rule would bring the 
most fraud to light without engendering unnecessary suits." 
Id. at 1171 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
 
Although I think Stinson's reading of "public disclosure" 
is likely too broad and should be reconsidered by this court 
en banc, I also believe that materials obtained through a 
FOIA request are easily distinguishable from the discovery 
material deemed a public disclosure in Stinson. In contrast 
with Stinson, we recently held that a county government 
report filed with the federal government is not a public 
disclosure. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of 
Del., 123 F.3d 734, 745-46 (3d Cir. 1997). Distinguishing 
our holding in Stinson, we noted the danger of extending 
"Stinson's `potential availability' standard . . . to the 
context" of administrative reports. Id. at 746 n.14. I think 
that the reasoning behind Stinson and our decision in 
Dunleavy lead to the conclusion that the FOIA material at 
issue here is not a public disclosure. 
 
First, it is clear that under Dunleavy, the simple fact that 
information subject to a FOIA request is potentially 
available to interested parties is insufficient to render it a 
"public disclosure." If this were the case, the information in 
Dunleavy, which the defendant had provided to a federal 
government agency, would have constituted a "public 
disclosure." More importantly, there is a clear distinction 
between discovery materials, which carry a "presumption 
. . . of public access," and the information contained in a 
FOIA request, which is provided to a single requester who 
is under no obligation to disclose this material to any other 
members of the public. This distinction can be seen by 
comparing the rules governing discovery with the statutory 
and regulatory provisions governing Mistick's FOIA request. 
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Local court rules often provide that while discovery 
material should not be filed with the court, see supra note 
1, such material may under certain circumstances befiled. 
In this circuit, each U.S. district court also has rules 
governing filing and access to discovery materials.2 In 
Stinson, the qui tam claimant argued that discovery 
material was not a "public disclosure" precisely because it 
need not be filed with the court. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 
1158. As noted above, however, the panel rejected this 
argument, responding: 
 
        We do not think that it is significant, for purposes of 
       interpreting the "public disclosure" provision of the 
       FCA, whether the discovery has in fact been filed. Due 
       to the large volume of discovery materials, many 
       district courts have adopted local rules which provide 
       that discovery materials should not be filed with the 
       court except by order of the court. Such local rules do 
       not generally preclude access by interested persons to 
       nonfiled material. In fact, the Local Rules of some 
       district courts provide that the court may order the 
       filing of discovery materials at the request of any 
       person who has an interest in reviewing the materials. 
 
Id. at 1158-59 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The 
panel reiterated this point in its conclusion: "To 
recapitulate, the presumption under Rule 5(d) of public 
access to civil discovery that is not subject to a protective 
order leads us to conclude that information received as a 
result of such discovery should be deemed based on a 
`public disclosure' for purposes of the FCA jurisdictional 
bar." Id. at 1159-60. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See D. Del. R. Civ. P. 5.4(c)-(e) (providing for filing when necessary 
for 
use before, during, or after trial, or on motion of the court or any 
party, 
or "on application by a non-party"); D.N.J. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c)(1) 
(providing 
for filing of discovery materials "when needed in a particular pretrial 
proceeding or upon order of the Court"); E.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 26.1(e) 
(providing for filing of discovery materials on motion of the court or of 
any party, "or on application by a non-party"); M.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 
5.4(c)- 
(e) (providing for filing of materials under certain circumstances); W.D. 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 5.3(E) (providing for filing of discovery materials "in the 
usual course in any case where any person shall file an affidavit with the 
clerk that he has a genuine interest in reading the material"). 
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While I have taken issue with the conclusion that the 
Stinson majority drew from this potential availability of 
discovery materials, see supra at 24-25, it is clear that 
such material is far more publicly accessible than is the 
material obtained under a FOIA request. FOIA expressly 
provides that records furnished in response to a FOIA 
request are to be made "available for public inspection and 
copying" only when the relevant agency determines that, 
"because of the nature of their subject matter, .. . [the 
records] have become or are likely to become the subject of 
subsequent requests for substantially the same records." 5 
U.S.C. S 552(a)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Otherwise, 
such records are provided only to the individual FOIA 
requester. Further, nothing in FOIA would require the FOIA 
recipient to share the fruits of his request with other 
members of the public. 
 
Although S 552(a)(2)(D) was added in 1996, 3 after Mistick 
made its FOIA request, nothing in FOIA at the time of 
Mistick's request would have required HUD (or Mistick) to 
make the materials provided through the request available 
to other members of the public. Additionally, in enacting 
the 1996 amendment, Congress did not intend to make 
most materials disclosed through a FOIA request 
presumptively accessible to the general public, but was 
only ensuring broad access to "previously-released records 
on a popular topic, such as the assassinations of public 
figures." H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 21 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3464. In fact, since enactment of 
S 552(a)(2)(D), HUD has not amended its own regulations 
governing FOIA requests, as it apparently does not 
anticipate fulfilling very many FOIA requests that are likely 
to become the subject of subsequent, substantially similar 
requests. See 24 C.F.R. S 15.12(a)(1)-(3) (1998) (providing 
that HUD will make available for public inspection and 
copying three of the four categories of material included in 
5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(2), failing to include material listed in 
S 552(a)(2)(D)). 
 
Therefore, unlike most discovery material, no member of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-231, S 4(5), 110 Stat. 3048, 3049. 
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the public has a right of access to information that another 
person obtained through a FOIA request--nor can anyone 
seek an order compelling a FOIA recipient himself to 
"publicly disclose" material obtained through his FOIA 
request. Of course, other members of the public may 
themselves file a FOIA request seeking the same 
information, but this does not depend on, nor change the 
nature of, the material released through the prior FOIA 
request by a single citizen. And of course the information 
remains in the government's files, but under Dunleavy, this 
is insufficient to turn these records into a "public 
disclosure." See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 746. 
 
In Dunleavy, we held that the list of enumerated sources 
in S 3730(e)(4)(A) "constitutes an exhaustive rendition of the 
possible sources" of a public disclosure. Id. at 744. The 
only enumerated sources that could be apposite here are 
an "administrative . . . report" or an "administrative . . . 
investigation." The majority concludes that an agency's act 
of fulfilling a FOIA request satisfies this source 
requirement, as both an administrative report and an 
administrative investigation. I think that this conclusion 
also is incorrect. FOIA requires federal agencies to search 
their records "for the purpose of locating those records 
which are responsive to a request." 5 U.S.C.S 552(a)(3)(D) 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996). It does not compel an agency to 
"investigate" a request, in the sense that an agency of the 
federal government normally investigates such things as 
allegations of fraud, crimes, or other wrongdoing. Rather, 
the Act simply forces agencies to "make [their] records 
promptly available," upon request. Id. S 552(a)(3)(A); see 
also 24 C.F.R. S 15.14(g)(2) (1998) (under HUD regulation 
governing costs of FOIA requests, "search" is defined as 
"time spent looking for material that is responsive to a 
request"). The Act is essentially a mechanism for 
duplicating records that are in the possession of the federal 
government and that are not otherwise excludable from 
members of the public. Thus, there is no "administrative 
. . . investigation." 
 
Further, the duplication can hardly be described as an 
"administrative . . . report." There is no analysis, summary, 
conclusion, or other content to "report" to the FOIA 
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requester. Rather, the actual records themselves, with 
possible redactions, are merely duplicated and provided to 
the FOIA requester. See 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(A) (1994); see 
also 24 C.F.R. S 15.14(a) (1998) (listing fees for HUD's 
fulfilling of FOIA requests through the "reproduction or 
duplication of documents"). Again, I believe that the 
majority strains to read the phrases "investigation" and 
"report" to encompass a government agency's rudimentary 
act of locating and duplicating requested records. Under 
this analysis, the methodological requirements for 
establishing the jurisdictional bar are not met. 
 
We held in Dunleavy that public disclosures bar a qui 
tam action only if the disclosures include both the 
misrepresented state of facts and the true state of facts. See 
Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 741. The majority concludes that the 
misrepresented state of facts (i.e., that the defendants did 
not know of the problem with Glid Wall until 1990) was 
disclosed in the FOIA material and that the true state of 
facts (i.e., that the defendants knew of the Glid Wall 
problem as early as 1987) was revealed in the state-court 
action, meeting the requirements for a public disclosure. 
Although I am constrained to agree with the majority's 
conclusion that (under our holding in Stinson) the discovery 
material in this case constitutes a public disclosure, 
because I would find that the FOIA material--the source of 
the misrepresented facts--is not a public disclosure, I 
would hold that Mistick's claim is not jurisdictionally 
barred. 
 
II. "Based Upon" 
 
Although my view of the FOIA materials would, in and of 
itself, require reversal of the District Court's dismissal of 
Mistick's claim, I address the "based upon" issue, as it is a 
critical issue, and one on which I believe the majority has 
reached a manifestly incorrect conclusion. Courts have 
differed on the proper interpretation of this phrase. 
Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron 
Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682-85 (D.C. Cir.) (holding 
that a qui tam action is based upon public disclosures if it 
relies on the same allegations or transactions as those in 
the public disclosure), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 172 (1997), 
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with United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a qui 
tam action is based upon public disclosures only if it 
"actually derived [its] allegations" from the public 
disclosures). So have commentators. ARTICLES 
FOOTNOTECompare Robert Salcido, Screening Out 
Unworthy Whistleblower Actions, 24 Pub. Cont. L.J. 237, 
272-79 (1995) (advocating broad view of "based upon"), 
with Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive 
Interpretations Under the False Claim Act's Public Disclosure 
Bar, 27 Pub. Cont. L.J. 669, 697-705 (1998) (advocating 
plain reading of "based upon"), and Robert L. Vogel, The 
Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 477, 499-501 (1995) (same). 
 
In view of this literature, I will not describe the debate at 
length here. I will, however, explain why I find more 
persuasive the view that a qui tam plaintiff is barred from 
bringing his claim only when he has derived his 
information regarding the allegations or transactions 
underlying his cause of action from public disclosures. 
 
A. The Contending Views of "Based Upon" 
 
The first court of appeals to adopt a plain reading of 
"based upon" was the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Luttig. The court noted that the "reading of `based 
upon' as meaning `derived from' is the only fair 
construction of the statutory phrase." Siller, 21 F.3d at 
1348. It therefore held that "a relator's action is `based 
upon' a public disclosure of allegations only where the 
relator has actually derived from that disclosure the 
allegations upon which his qui tam action is based." Id. The 
court also noted that its reading was not only the most 
logical reading of the statute's plain text, but also 
effectuated Congress's goal of precluding "parasitic" suits 
by non-whistleblowers attempting to take advantage of 
public disclosures: "[I]t is self-evident that a suit that 
includes allegations that happen to be similar (even 
identical) to those already publicly disclosed, but[that] 
were not actually derived from those public disclosures, 
simply is not, in any sense, parasitic." Id.  
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The contrasting view is explicated in Judge Wald's 
decision for the D.C. Circuit in Findley. In addition to 
claiming that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of"based 
upon" rendered the "original source" exception superfluous, 
the court in Findley considered the legislative history of the 
FCA. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 683-84. It expressed its 
belief that Congress, in the 1986 amendments, "changed 
the focus of the jurisdictional bar from evidence of fraud 
inside the government's overcrowded file cabinets to fraud 
already exposed in the public domain." Id. at 684. 
 
The majority today agrees with Findley's reading of 
"based upon" and rejects Siller's plain reading of the 
jurisdictional bar. It cites two justifications for doing so: (1) 
because Congress was sloppy in choosing the language of 
the jurisdictional bar, we should not give this text its plain 
meaning, and (2) the plain reading of "based upon" renders 
the "original source" exception superfluous. See Maj. Op. at 
15-16. I take up each of these contentions below, after a 
discussion of the Act's plain meaning. I conclude by 
considering whether the plain reading of the text 
adequately fulfills Congress's goals in the 1986 
amendments. 
 
B. The Plain Meaning of "Based Upon"  
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that 
recourse to legislative history or underlying legislative 
intent is unnecessary when a statute's text is clear and 
does not lead to an absurd result. See, e.g., Darby v. 
Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993) ("Recourse to the 
legislative history of [a provision of the APA] is unnecessary 
in light of the plain meaning of the statutory text."); see 
also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 
523 U.S. 26, 37 (1998) ("The language is straightforward, 
and with a straightforward application ready to hand, 
statutory interpretation has no business getting 
metaphysical."); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429- 
30 (1981) ("We begin by looking to the language of the Act. 
. . . When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, 
judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and exceptional 
circumstances." (internal quotations omitted)). The Court 
has instructed us to begin with a statute's text when 
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discerning its meaning, and to "assume that the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words 
used." United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 
As the Fourth Circuit said in Siller, "Section 
3730(e)(4)(A)'s use of the phrase `based upon' is. . . 
susceptible of a straightforward textual exegesis. To `base 
upon' means to `use as a basis for.' " 21 F.3d at 1348 
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 180 
(1986)). I agree with this plain reading of the phrase "based 
upon" and further concur with Siller's conclusion that there 
is no usage, "let alone a common one or a dictionary 
definition, that suggests that `based upon' can mean 
`supported by.' " Id. at 1349. 
 
Other federal statutes and case law support my plain 
reading of the phrase "based upon." For example, an 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
allows a plaintiff to bring suit against a foreign government 
in any case "in which the action is based upon a 
commercial activity carried on . . . by the foreign state." 28 
U.S.C. S 1605(a)(2) (1994). In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 
U.S. 349 (1993), the plaintiff had allegedly been tortured 
and beaten by Saudi Arabian law enforcement officers in 
retaliation for his complaints about safety problems at a 
Saudi hospital at which he worked. See id. at 352-53. He 
brought an action against the Saudi government, 
contending that his claim was "based upon a commercial 
activity" of that government because he was recruited to 
work at its hospital, signed an employment contract with 
the government to work at the hospital, and was actually 
employed by the government to work there. 
 
In determining whether the action was "based upon a 
commercial activity," the Supreme Court first noted: 
 
       Although the Act contains no definition of the phrase 
       "based upon," and the relatively sparse legislative 
       history offers no assistance, guidance is hardly 
       necessary. In denoting conduct that forms the `basis,' 
       or `foundation,' for a claim, the phrase is read most 
       naturally to mean those elements of a claim that, if 
       proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his 
       theory of the case. 
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Id. at 357 (citing Black's Law Dictionary, Random House 
Dictionary, and Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary). The Court then held that, "where a claim rests 
entirely upon activities sovereign in character, . .. 
jurisdiction will not exist under that clause regardless of 
any connection the sovereign acts may have with 
commercial activity." Id. at 358 n.4. Because the 
recruitment, contract signing, and employment at the 
hospital, all admittedly commercial in character,"[were] not 
the basis for the Nelsons' suit," the action was not based 
upon a commercial activity of the foreign government. Id. at 
358; see also id. at 364 (White, J., concurring in judgment) 
(agreeing with the majority that the recruiting and hiring of 
the plaintiff was " `not the basis for the Nelsons' suit,' for it 
is unrelated to the elements of [their] complaint" (citation 
omitted)). 
 
The commercial activities may have provided the 
background for the complaint and have had a "connection" 
to the sovereign acts that the claim was based upon, but 
the action was not derived from these commercial activities; 
rather, the action was derived from the tortious acts of 
foreign government officials. Therefore, it was not "based 
upon" commercial activities of the foreign government. 
 
Similarly, in the FCA context, I believe that "guidance is 
hardly necessary." While public disclosures will typically 
have some connection to the allegations in a relator's 
complaint, in the sense that the disclosures and the 
allegations in the complaint are similar, the latter cannot 
be said to be "based upon" the former when the complaint 
"rests upon" allegations contained in some other (non- 
publicly disclosed) source. 
 
Judicial use of the words "based upon" also supports my 
reading of this simple phrase. For example, in the context 
of the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary 
rule, evidence is not excluded if it is derived from some 
source other than the tainted search or identification. The 
Supreme Court has described the government's burden in 
such a situation as proving that evidence introduced at trial 
was "based upon" some source other than the illegal one, or 
that "the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
[not] been come at by exploitation of that illegality [but] 
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instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint." United States v. Wade , 388 U.S. 218, 
241 (1967) (internal quotation omitted). The Court's use of 
the phrase "based upon" in Wade, to mean "come at by 
exploitation of," is consistent with my plain reading of 
"based upon" in the FCA. If a qui tam action exists only by 
exploitation of publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions, it falls within the jurisdictional bar. If, on the 
other hand, knowledge of the allegations or transactions at 
the heart of a qui tam claim was obtained through"means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint" of the public disclosures, the bar should not apply.4 
 
In the present case, the majority finds that a qui tam 
action that relies on information that is similar to that 
which has been publicly disclosed is ineluctably"based 
upon" the public disclosures, even though the qui tam 
relator has not "come at [this information] by exploitation 
of " the public disclosures, or "substantially copied" its 
information from the public disclosures. I find that this 
reading flies in the face of the plain meaning of"based 
upon," as indicated by its usage in common parlance, in 
other statutes, and in judicial opinions. It is noteworthy 
that the majority does not take issue with this plain 
meaning discussion. Indeed, it implicitly concedes its 
efficacy, though not its overwhelming force. I now turn to 
the majority's efforts to blunt the pellucid text of the FCA 
by reference to Congress's sloppy drafting and the alleged 
undermining of the "original source" exception by this plain 
reading of the statute. I then examine the purpose and 
policy undergirding the qui tam statute, which inform the 
varying interpretations of "based upon." But on the basis of 
the plain meaning alone, I would find that the jurisdictional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. My plain reading of "based upon" finds support in still other fields. 
For 
example, under copyright law, a "derivative" work is defined as one that 
is "based upon one or more preexisting works," 17 U.S.C. S 101 (1994), 
a definition that has been read as requiring that the derivative work be 
"substantially copied from a prior work." 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright S 3.01, at 3-3 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
In other words, if the latter work is similar to the preexisting one, but 
is 
not copied substantially therefrom, it is not "based upon" that 
preexisting work. 
 
                                35 
  
bar does not apply to a qui tam claim that is not derived 
from public disclosures. 
 
C. Congress's Sloppy Drafting 
 
The majority claims that we may ignore the plain 
meaning of S 3730(e)(4)(A) because it "does not reflect 
careful drafting or a precise use of language." Maj. Op. at 
18.5 The majority lists a number of minor drafting problems 
in support of its argument. For example, it notes the 
mistaken identification of the General Accounting Office (or 
"GAO") as the "Government Accounting Office,"6 the use of 
the phrase "hearing" when the broader concept of "trial" 
was clearly intended, and the preclusion of jurisdiction over 
qui tam "actions," when such actions may contain many 
"claims," some of which are "based upon" public 
disclosures and others which are not. The majority's 
reliance on Congress's alleged sloppiness appears to be a 
different way of saying that "the language of the statute is 
ambiguous," thereby giving us license to "consider the 
structure and context of the ambiguous language," Findley, 
105 F.3d at 683, rather than giving it its plain meaning. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This is hardly a new phenomenon. Congress regularly lapses into 
sloppy drafting, as has been frequently noted by courts. See, e.g., H.J. 
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) ("RICO may 
be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it 
is 
so inclined, and not for this Court."); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water 
Auth. 
v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that CERCLA 
is "notorious for its lack of clarity and poor draftsmanship"); Cvikich v. 
Railroad Retirement Bd., 860 F.2d 103, 104 (3d Cir. 1988) (giving a 
provision of the Railroad Retirement Act its plain meaning, despite its 
"poor draftsmanship"). Yet we interpret these poorly drafted statutes as 
best we can, and "assume that in drafting legislation, Congress says 
what it means." Sundance Assocs., Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804, 809 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
 
6. The drafter who made this error was likely confused by the 
appellations of the Government Printing Office, which publishes 
government reports, and the General Accounting Office, which performs 
government audits. I note that both reports and audits of the 
"Government Accounting Office" are listed as public disclosures in 
S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
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I find this argument unpersuasive because, whether or 
not Congress was sloppy in its choice of certain words, 
there is nothing ambiguous about the phrase "based upon," 
and its interpretation requires no "fine parsing of the 
syntax of S 3730(e)(4)(A)." Maj. Op. at 19. As for the 
majority's examples of Congress's sloppiness, it certainly 
was reasonable for Congress to use the general phrase, 
"criminal, civil, or administrative hearing," if it intended to 
include under this aegis criminal or civil trials. Its choice of 
words could easily reflect not imprecise drafting, but an 
attempt to broadly encompass criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceedings, without listing every possibility, 
such as criminal pre-trial hearings, criminal trials, 
sentencing hearings, civil discovery proceedings, civil trials, 
appellate hearings, administrative hearings, etc. 
 
The majority gives no indication of the origin of the GAO 
mistake, and it is possible that it was simply a transcribing 
problem or a mistake by a single staff person that escaped 
detection. Courts have frequently referred to the General 
Accounting Office as the Government Accounting Office, a 
reasonable mistake on which I believe the majority places 
more emphasis than it deserves. See, e.g., Adams v. 
Hinchman, 154 F.3d 420, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (referring to 
the "Government Accounting Office" in a Fair Labor 
Standards Act case brought by federal employees), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2046 (1999); Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 
("We take notice of the fact that Congress and the 
Government Accounting Office are entities of our federal 
government."). 
 
In addition, Congress has previously made the same 
mistake, and corrected it when its error was discovered. 
Compare Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, 
Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-233, S 106(d), 105 Stat. 1761, 1764 (adding new 
subsection (k)(11)(B) to 12 U.S.C. S 1441a, requiring the 
Resolution Trust Corporation to report to certain 
congressional committees "[t]he total number of individuals 
performing services for the Corporation as an employee of 
. . . the Government Accounting Office"), with Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 
S 1611(d)(3)(B), 106 Stat. 3672, 4091 (amending 
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S 1441a(k)(11)(B), to replace "Government Accounting 
Office" with "General Accounting Office").7 The majority 
cannot be suggesting that courts should have ignored the 
plain meaning of the entire Resolution Trust Corporation 
Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991, 
simply because of the misidentification of the GAO in one 
part of that enactment. 
 
Finally, as with its misnaming of the GAO, Congress's 
use of a broad term such as "action" (or "case") when the 
more limited "claim" might be more appropriate is far from 
unprecedented. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. 
Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2054 (1998) ("Conceivably, one 
might also read [28 U.S.C. S 1447(c)'s] reference to `case,' to 
include a claim within a case as well as the entire case."). 
As noted supra note 5, however, our ultimate task is to 
effectuate Congress's intent, as demonstrated first and 
foremost by the language it has employed, even if that 
language is less than precise. 
 
Most importantly, as I discuss infra Part II.E, even if the 
language of the FCA is imprecise or ambiguous, thereby 
justifying resort to legislative intent, Congress's intent is 
better effectuated by the narrow reading of "based upon." 
Suffice it to say here that I find unavailing the majority's 
attempt to avoid the plain meaning of this phrase on the 
ground that Congress was being sloppy at the time it 
codified the relevant statutory provision. 
 
D. Does a Plain Reading of "Based Upon" Render the 
       "Original Source" Exception Meaningless? 
 
The majority adopts the view of the D.C. Circuit that the 
plain reading of "based upon" renders the"original source" 
exception superfluous, a result we should try to avoid. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Apparently, the leading newspapers in our nation's capital are also not 
immune to the problem of misnaming the GAO. A search of the relevant 
Westlaw databases produced 128 articles from the Washington Post over 
the past fifteen years in which the GAO was mistakenly identified as the 
"Government Accounting Office," and 48 articles from the Washington 
Times over the past nine years in which the same mistake was made. On 
the other hand, the papers correctly identified the GAO thousands of 
times during these periods. 
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Maj. Op. at 15-16. In Findley, Judge Wald posited an 
example of a relator who "independently" investigated a 
fraud after reading about it in the Washington Post or 
Washington Times in order to qualify as an original source 
despite the fact that the hypothetical relator's claim was 
derived from a public disclosure. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 
683. It is clear, however, that the present relator, Mistick, 
is nothing like the opportunistic and parasitic relator 
conjured up by Judge Wald. Rather, Mistick plausibly 
alleges (but has not had the opportunity to prove) that it 
learned of defendants' fraud well before it was "publicly 
disclosed" in state-court litigation (not in a widely 
circulated newspaper). Thus, Judge Wald's bellwether 
example is so extreme as to undermine her position. 
 
Under the plain reading of "based upon," it is true that a 
relator whose claim is derived entirely from public 
disclosures cannot be an original source because the entire 
claim is "dependent" on the public disclosures, and a 
fortiori the relator does not have "independent" knowledge 
of any elements of his claim. While it is entirely possible 
that Congress, in enacting the complex and overlapping 
amendments to the FCA in 1986, failed to foresee that its 
new "based upon" language could render the"original 
source" exception superfluous, this provides scant basis for 
our failing to give effect to plain congressional language. 
Ironically, the majority implies that the same Congress 
whose sloppy drafting it invokes to justify ignoring the 
FCA's plain meaning would have been careful (or 
sufficiently astute) to avoid enacting an original source 
exception that has subtle, and perhaps unintended, 
interactions with the jurisdictional bar in S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
But even under the plain reading of "based upon," I believe 
that there are at least two situations in which the original 
source exception will assist a relator whose claim is (or 
appears to be) derived from public disclosures. 
 
First, in Stinson, the majority observed that, 
"[u]ndoubtedly, it is not necessary for a relator to have all 
the relevant information in order to qualify as 
`independent.' " Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1160; see also United 
States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 
645, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a relator, to be an 
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original source, need have "direct and independent 
knowledge of any essential element of the underlying fraud 
transaction"). Just as the Stinson majority assumed that an 
original source need not have independent knowledge of all 
elements of his claim, it is possible that a qui tam claim 
need not be derived entirely from public disclosures to fall 
under the "based upon" jurisdictional bar, as long as some 
essential element of the qui tam claim is derived from 
public disclosures. A number of courts have so held, 
though I take no position here on this complex question. 
See, e.g., Farmington, 166 F.3d at 863 (holding that a claim 
is "based upon" a public disclosure "[i]f the public 
disclosure from which the information is actually derived is 
essential to a qui tam claim"); cf. United States ex rel. 
Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 
1992) (holding that "an FCA qui tam action even partly 
based upon publicly disclosed allegations or transactions is 
nonetheless `based upon' such allegations or transactions"). 
Under this view, a relator who is barred because he has 
derived some of his fraud information from a public 
disclosure may still bring the claim as an original source if 
he has direct and independent knowledge of some other 
essential element of the claim. 
 
Second, my view of "based upon" would admittedly 
require a factual inquiry into the basis of a qui tam relator's 
allegations. Whenever there were public disclosures 
revealing both the true and the misrepresented facts, a 
defendant would no doubt claim that the relator derived his 
information from these disclosures. In response, it may be 
easier for the relator to establish himself as an"original 
source" of the information than to successfully disprove a 
causal link between the public disclosures and his qui tam 
claim. The original source exception would sometimes be 
invoked by a relator with a claim that is not technically 
derived from public disclosures, but that is difficult to 
separate from those disclosures. This would be particularly 
true in the case of widely publicized disclosures, such as 
those in Judge Wald's example. If the relator in her 
example had prior direct knowledge of the fraud allegations 
revealed in the newspaper articles, but failed tofile suit 
until after the articles appeared (a scenario quite similar to 
Mistick's), it may well be easier for that relator to simply 
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identify its prior "original source" of the information than to 
prove that its qui tam action is not causally linked with the 
very public disclosures. 
 
The majority has sought to discredit the foregoing 
analysis. The majority's response inevitably has some force, 
but that is so because minor, unintended consequences 
may result from our effectuating the plain meaning and 
evident intent of a complex federal statute. But only my 
reading of the jurisdictional bar gives effect to (and fulfills 
Congress's intent regarding) both the "based upon" 
language and the "original source" exception, without 
ignoring the plain meaning of either phrase. The intent of 
the "original source" exception is to allow one who 
contributes valuable, first-hand information regarding a 
fraud on the government to bring a qui tam action whether 
or not that information (or possibly other information 
related to the fraud) was publicly disclosed, and whether or 
not that relator can prove that his claim is not derived from 
these disclosures. The "based upon" requirement is 
intended to foreclose parasitic qui tam suits that derive 
their claim from publicly disclosed information. Taken 
together, these two requirements will bar actions by 
relators who piggyback on public disclosures and cannot 
demonstrate that they have contributed any useful (i.e., 
independent and direct) information regarding a fraud on 
the government. 
 
E. Purpose of Qui Tam Actions 
 
1. Legislative Intent 
 
Even if I were to ignore the plain meaning of the FCA and 
to instead look to Congress's alleged intent in amending the 
statute in 1986, I believe that my reading of "based upon" 
more fully effectuates all of Congress's goals. Congress had 
three primary aims in enacting the 1986 amendments: (1) 
encouraging those with information regarding frauds on the 
government to disclose this information; (2) discouraging 
parasitic qui tam actions that simply take advantage of 
information already in the public domain; and (3) assisting 
--and prodding--the government to act upon information 
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that it had been (or is being) defrauded. See  S. Rep. No. 99- 
345, at 1-8, 23-24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5266-73, 5288-89; cf. Thompson, supra, at 693 
("Congress not only wanted to expose fraud but also wanted 
to encourage the use of nongovernmental resources to 
activate and advance qui tam cases to prosecution."). My 
interpretation of "based upon" effectuates all three of these 
goals, while the view adopted by the majority in this case 
will in many situations only advance the first goal. 
 
Initially, I note that it is only the hair-trigger invocation 
of the jurisdictional bar, created by our precedent in 
Stinson, that renders the strained interpretation of "based 
upon" even arguably necessary. Under Stinson , the phrase 
"public disclosure" is something of a misnomer. While it 
may conjure up images of a widely disseminated piece of 
information or something divulged at a press conference, it 
includes information revealed to a small number of 
persons, such as evidence disclosed to a single litigant 
through unfiled state-court discovery (or, under the 
majority's holding today, information obtained from a single 
FOIA request). See supra Part I. Therefore, a "public 
disclosure" will exist in a great number of qui tam cases, 
foreclosing all actions "based upon" these disclosures if not 
brought by an original source. 
 
In the paradigmatic whistleblower case, the varying 
interpretations of "based upon" will usually lead to the 
same result. When a public disclosure is widely 
disseminated, such as through a filing in a highly 
publicized legal case or in a press conference by a 
whistleblower or the government agency involved, the 
information regarding the fraud will have been brought 
forth, anyone who is not an original source will almost 
certainly be prevented from demonstrating that their claim 
was not derived from the highly publicized public 
disclosure, and the government will be hard pressed to sit 
on the information that it was defrauded, given the 
publicity. 
 
However, in the case of a "public disclosure" in legal 
construct only, the different interpretations of"based upon" 
will lead to varying results, and, I contend, the plain 
reading of "based upon" will most fully effectuate all of the 
 
                                42 
  
goals Congress sought to advance in the 1986 
amendments. The argument that a broad reading of"based 
upon" most fully effectuates Congress's intent to preclude 
parasitic suits "ignores the reality that the term `public 
disclosures' encompasses disclosures that receive all 
different degrees of publicity, reaching audiences ranging 
from one person to millions of people." Vogel, supra, at 513. 
 
When allegations have been "publicly disclosed" under 
Stinson's broad interpretation of this phrase, but have been 
revealed to few people, rather than "millions of people," the 
purpose of the FCA is best fulfilled by encouraging those 
who discover the information through some other source to 
bring suit. This can be seen from our decision in Stinson, 
and in the majority's holding today that information 
obtained through a FOIA request is a "public disclosure." In 
both cases, if the narrow group of individuals (as few as 
one) who are privy to these "disclosures" decide to keep 
them secret, at least two purposes of the FCA--encouraging 
the disclosure of fraud, and prodding and/or assisting the 
government in prosecuting this fraud--will be furthered 
only if another individual who discovers the fraud through 
some other means is allowed to bring a qui tam action. 
 
2. Legislative History 
 
While disclaiming reliance on legislative history, see Maj. 
Op. at 19 n.9, the majority cites two statements by FCA 
sponsors in support of its argument. However, as this court 
has previously noted, statements can easily be found 
pointing in opposite directions when it comes to the FCA's 
legislative history. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154 ("The bill 
that eventuated in the 1986 amendments underwent 
substantial revisions during its legislative path. This 
provides ample opportunity to search the legislative history 
and find some support somewhere for almost any 
construction of the many ambiguous terms in thefinal 
version."). 
 
The D.C. Circuit in Findley purported to rely more 
extensively on legislative history, arguing that, in changing 
the jurisdictional bar of the FCA from claims "based upon 
evidence or information in the possession of the United 
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States" to those "based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions," Congress altered the focus of 
the bar from information in the government's possession to 
"fraud already exposed in the public domain." Findley, 105 
F.3d at 684. More precisely, however, what Congress 
intended was to change the focus from information in the 
government's possession to information that is sufficiently 
publicly disclosed to bring the fraud to the government's 
attention and to spur it into acting upon the information. 
 
If Congress had the intent claimed by the Findley court, 
it could simply have substituted in the jurisdictional bar 
the phrase "information that has been publicly disclosed" 
for "information in the possession of the United States." The 
statute would then have read, in relevant part,"No court 
shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section 
based upon evidence or information that has been publicly 
disclosed in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, 
[etc.] . . . ." Instead, Congress completely changed the focus 
of the key phrase "based upon," eliminating a structure in 
which the phrase referred to "evidence or information," and 
creating one in which it referred to "public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions." The actual statute now reads, 
"No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this 
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, 
[etc.] . . . ." 
 
There is a fundamental difference between a claim that is 
based upon certain information that has been publicly 
disclosed, and a claim that is based upon certain 
enumerated public disclosures. This difference evinces an 
intent to focus not broadly on information in the public 
domain, but narrowly on the specific public disclosures 
that contain the information. The Findley court interpreted 
"based upon" as if Congress chose to make the former 
change--precluding suits based upon certain information-- 
rather than the change it actually made, in which"based 
upon" refers to certain disclosures. While this change in 
focus is not conclusive in and of itself, I believe the D.C. 
Circuit's misreading of this substantial change undercuts 
its argument regarding Congress's intent. 
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F. Summary 
 
In sum, I do not believe we can escape the plain meaning 
of the phrase "based upon" in the FCA's jurisdictional bar. 
There is no justification for giving this phrase a convoluted 
reading that not only ignores its plain meaning, but that 
also extends Stinson's error of interpreting the jurisdictional 
bar so as to foreclose virtually all qui tam suits that do not 
fit within the mold of the paradigmatic 
insider/whistleblower case. The plain meaning most 
effectively fulfills Congress's intent, and does so without 
ignoring or rendering meaningless any portion of the 1986 
amendments. 
 
III. Disposition of Mistick's Qui Tam Suit 
 
As I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
material obtained through Mistick's FOIA request was a 
public disclosure, I would find that the misrepresented 
state of facts underlying its qui tam claim had not been 
publicly disclosed. Therefore, under our holding in 
Dunleavy that the jurisdictional bar does not apply unless 
both the true and the misrepresented facts have been 
publicly disclosed through one of the enumerated sources, 
Mistick's qui tam claim is not jurisdictionally barred. 
 
But even if the FOIA material were to constitute a public 
disclosure, Mistick's qui tam action may not be"based 
upon" public disclosures because it claims that it learned of 
the true state of facts not through the public disclosure in 
the state-court action, but earlier, through meetings with 
the maker of Glid Wall, and through its own independent 
investigations. Because it is ultimately a fact question 
whether Mistick's information underlying its qui tam action 
was derived from the public disclosures, and because the 
District Court did not reach this issue, I would remand for 
the District Court's determination of this issue in the first 
instance. Cf. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1349 (remanding for the 
district court to determine whether the allegations in a 
relator's action were derived from a public disclosure); 
Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 
891 n.16 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he district court is free to 
determine facts relevant to its jurisdiction . . . ."). 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
The policy consideration undergirding the restrictive view 
of qui tam litigation (and the expansive view of the 
jurisdictional bar) is that it is necessary to eliminate 
opportunistic and parasitic lawsuits. I share the view that 
such suits are an abomination. I believe, however, that 
Stinson, Findley, and their progeny (including the majority 
opinion here) cut such a broad swath that they eviscerate 
bona fide suits, such as the one at bar, in a laudable but 
misguided effort to halt a feared torrent of litigation. 
 
In my view, the recent amendments to the False Claims 
Act were intended to encourage qui tam suits that do not 
derive their knowledge of an underlying fraud from truly 
public disclosures, and to encourage those with information 
about frauds on the government to inform the government 
about the fraud, assist the government in bringing legal 
action to bear against the defrauders, and, if necessary, 
prod the government into action. I see the majority opinion 
as inconsistent with this intent of Congress. More 
importantly, it is inconsistent with the plain language of the 
FCA. Because the majority's misreading affects the outcome 
of this case, I respectfully dissent. 
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